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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS1 JUDGMENTS CONCERNING MR. CRANE'S 
CREDIBILITY ARE IRRELEVANT TO THE SUBSTANTIAL 
QUESTIONS OF FACT AND LAW RAISED ON APPEAL; 
ARE PRESENTED MERELY TO PREJUDICE THE COURT'S 
DECISION; AND SHOULD BE DISREGARDED BY THE 
COURT AND STRICKEN FROM THE RECORD. 
Utah law requires that briefs presented on appeal "be 
concise, presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper 
headings and free from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or 
scandalous matters. (Emphasis added.)11 Rules of the Utah 
Supreme Court, Rule 24(k). "Briefs which are not in compliance 
may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the 
Court, and/or the Court may assess attorney's fees against the 
offending lawyer." Id. 
Large portions of Respondents1 Brief are dedicated to 
Respondents1 asserted belief that Appellant Clifford Crane's 
testimony lacks credibility. (Respondents1 Brief, hereinafter 
RB, at 4, 9, 16-18, 30.) Such assertions have no basis in the 
trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and are 
designed to prejudice this Court's ability to reach a neutral and 
unbiased decision on the merits of the facts and laws considered 
by the trial judge. All such assertions are immaterial and 
irrelevant to the correctness of the trial court's Judgment. 
Pursuant to Utah, Appellants respectfully request that this 
Court disregard all portions of Respondents' Brief which 
constitute prejudicial statements concerning Respondent's 
credibility, specifically including those found on pages 4, 9, 
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16-18, and 30, be disregarded and stricken from the record on 
appeal. Respondents further implore this Court to concentrate 
its review on the rulings of law as they have been applied to the 
facts determined by the trial judge below. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENTS HAVE INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT 
THE "MAILBOX RULE", PERTAINING TO OFFER AN 
ACCEPTANCE OF A CONTRACT, DOES NOT PERTAIN TO 
THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE AND, THEREFORE, 
ERR IN STATING THAT RESPONDENTS1 OFFER WAS 
EFFECTIVELY WITHDRAWN PRIOR TO ACCEPTANCE. 
Appellants urge the Court to review the laws relating to 
offer and acceptance as outlined in their original brief, Point 
I. To counter Appellants1 argument that a contract was formed on 
February 21, 1985, when Appellants1 California attorney placed a 
letter of acceptance (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 19A) in the United 
States Post Office, Respondents recite an exception to the rule 
which states that "an offer may restrict the manner of 
acceptance, provided his or her intention to do so is clearly 
expressed." (RB at 19) Respondents embellish their argument by 
citing American Jurisprudence Second which explains that the 
validity of acceptance by mail depends upon whether such 
acceptance has been "authorized". (RB at 19) 
The very sources of law cited by Respondents indicate that 
the trial court erred in its application of the law to the facts 
of record. In fact, there was no "clear expression" on the part 
of Respondents that would have indicated that acceptance by mail 
was inappropriate. The parties were dealing with each other at a 
considerable distance and the offer itself was delivered by the 
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United States Postal service* Furthermore, Appellants were 
specifically "authorized" to "execute and send" all documents to 
the closing agent. (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7) 
Respondents attempt to base their argument against finding 
the formation of a contract on statements contained in the 
Agreements for Sale of Limited Partnership Interest (Plaintiffs1 
Exhibits 8 and 9) and the letter to Mr. Mixon from Mr. Russell J. 
Gallian (Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 12) which accompanied the sales 
agreements. (RB at 19) These documents contain statements to 
the effect that signed documents "shall be deposited with the 
escrow agent to be delivered to buyer upon closing", and that 
"upon receipt" of the signed agreements the escrow agent would 
disburse the appropriate funds. 
While the foregoing terms indicate that the escrow agent was 
not free to act until the anticipated documentation was in its 
possession, such terms provide no basis for concluding that a 
contract between the parties had not been formed at an earlier 
date. If Respondents1 reasoning is accepted, what would prevent 
them from claiming that acceptance would not be complete until 
the escrow agent "delivered to buyer upon closing" the 
anticipated documentation? 
In other words, the arrangements Respondents made with Dixie 
Title are not one and the same as the contract concluded between 
the parties. Respondents1 attack on the mailbox rule confuses 
acceptance of an offer to contract with the conditions of closing 
the escrow. Deposit into escrow of the anticipated documents was 
merely a condition of closing the escrow. Even if the documents 
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had been lost in the mail, delaying the closing of escrow until 
replacements could be obtained, a contract would have been 
concluded at the time the originals were deposited in the Post 
Office on February 21, 1985. 
In addition, Respondents read too much into statements made 
by Mr. Crane that he understood that documents were to be 
deposited with the escrow agent in order to complete the 
transaction. (RB at 20) There is no indication in any of these 
statements that Mr. Crane believed that formation of a contract 
was dependent upon the escrow agent's actual possession of the 
subject agreements. In fact, Mr. Crane was of the belief and 
opinion that an agreement had been concluded as early as 
November, 1984, a position he maintained throughout the trial of 
this case. (TR1 at 69) Therefore, Respondents1 assertions that 
"both parties understood that Crane's acceptance was dependent 
upon the actual deposit of documents with escrow, "are simply 
inaccurate and misleading". (RB at 21) 
Respondents rely upon the case of Williams v. Singleton, 723 
P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1986), for the proposition that an offeror 
may restrict the manner of offeree's acceptance. Appellants do 
not argue anything contrary, but do wish to remind the Court that 
the Williams case requires that the offeror "clearly" express his 
or her intention to do so. In fact, in Williams this Court cited 
an Oregon opinion which makes it absolutely clear that the 
offeror is responsible to restrict its anticipated modes of 
acceptance: 
An offeror may restrict the manner of 
acceptance, provided nis intention to do so is 
clearly expressed. 
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"The offeror creates the power of acceptance; 
and he has full control over the character and 
extent of the power that he creates. He can 
prescribe a single and exclusive mode of 
acceptance. It makes no difference how 
unreasonable or difficult the prescribed mode 
may be, J^L the offeror clearly expresses, in 
the terms of the communicated offer itself, 
his intention to exclude all other modes of 
acceptance... . (Original emphasis)" 1 Corbm 
on Contracts § 88, 373-374 (1963). 
Cochran v. Connell, 632 P.2d 1385, 1387 (Or. App. 1981). 
Respondents failed to make it clear that "all other modes of 
acceptance" were unacceptable. In fact, they "clearly" 
authorized acceptance by mail in the following passage: 
Enclosed you will find documents which you 
should execute and send to the closing agent 
in connection with your sale of your Limited 
Partnership interest in Timberbrook Village 
Ltd. The closing agent is Dixie Title Co. 
Inc., 205 East Tabernacle, St. George, Utah 
84770 (a self addressed envelope is enclosed 
for your convenience). (Emphasis added) 
(Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 7) 
Appellants respectfully urge this court to conclude that the 
Findings of Fact and the law of contracts in the State of Utah 
demonstrate that the trial court has erred in its determination 
that Mr. Mixon's letter of February 18, 1985, did not constitute 
a valid and timely acceptance. If this conclusions is reached, 
Respondents' Third Point which claims that the offer was 
effectively withdrawn on February 22, 1985, is without meaning or 
effect on the existing contractual obligations. 
POINT III 
ANY CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN APPELLANTS1 
ACCEPTANCE WERE ALREADY IMPLIED IN THE 
PARTIES1 CONTRACT AND, AS SUCH, DO NOT 
CONSTITUTE A COUNTEROFFER. 
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To avoid any undue repetition. Appellants refer the Court to 
their original brieff Point II, for a full examination of 
arguments against Respondents1 claim that Mr. Mixon's letter of 
February 18f 1985, constituted a counteroffer by proposing 
additional conditions to the contract. Appellants wish to 
emphasize, however, that the trial court's Findings of Fact 
considered only one of three supposed "conditions" to be a new 
element which invalidated the original offer. Based on the 
arguments heretofore outlined, this Court should conclude that 
the trial court committed reversible error in adopting Finding of 
Fact No. 19. 
Respondents attempt to further confuse this issue by 
introducing a supposed "new condition" which was not included in 
the trial court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. They 
argue that dismissal of the accounting suit which was instigated 
by Mr. Crane, as a limited partner, to determine the state of the 
Timberbrook's records was also a condition which must be 
satisfied before Respondents "felt a duty to close". (RB at 
26-27). 
While the trial court took notice of the accounting lawsuit, 
it never concluded, neither was there any discussion of the fact, 
that such an action constituted an additional condition which 
must be satisfied prior to concluding the subject agreement. 
(Finding of Fact No. 11) As a limited partner in Timberbrook 
Village, Ltd., Mr. Crane was entitled by law to examine the books 
of the partnership to assure that his interests were being 
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properly protected. In fact, Mr. Crane had attempted to examine 
the records, but was unsuccessful in his attempts. (TR1 at 77) 
Furthermore, it is unclear that Respondents communicated any 
expectation that the accounting law suit be dropped as a 
condition to contract formation. Respondents1 Brief argues that 
Plaintiffs1 Exhibit 13 (P-13), a letter from Mr. Russell Gallian 
to Mr. Willard R. Bishop, dated February 11, 1985, conclusively 
demonstrates that dismissal was required as a condition of 
contract formation. (RB at 26-27) 
Quite to the contrary, however, this letter presents only 
confusion concerning the actual state of contract negotiations. 
The entire body of the letter (P-13) reads as follows: 
I apologize for not responding to your earlier 
letters but I've since had substantial 
discussions with Mr. Crane's California 
attorney and I took his direction that the 
problem had been solved. 
As you may or may not know, we had a deal with 
Mr. Crane to buy out his interest some time 
ago. Since that time, Mr. Crane came to the 
Timberbrook offices and was given full access 
to the books and records and I assume that he 
was satisfied from that effort because his 
attorney has now instructed that they intend 
to go ahead with the purchase of his interest. 
We are now awaiting documents to be placed in 
escrow at Dixie Title Company, at which time 
tne closing will be completed and Mr. Crane 
will no longer be associated with Timberbrook. 
Accordingly, I am assuming that the variouis 
problems we may have had with Mr. Crane are 
now solved. If this is not the case, I would 
be pleased to hear from you. I think that any 
problems that we may have had with Mr. Crane 
are now resolved. (Emphasis added) 
As the Court can easily see, Mr. Gallian believed that the 
buy out deal had been struck "some time ago." It is of interest 
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that Respondents, including Mr. Gallian, would now attempt to use 
this same letter as an indication that no contract had been 
concluded. In addition, it can be seen that the letter relied on 
by Respondents does not provide the "clear" expression required 
for an offeror to condition offeree's mode or expression of 
acceptance. 
It is also interesting to note that on the very same day 
P-13 was sent to Mr. Bishop and copied to Mr. Mixon, Mr. Gallian 
sent a second letter (P-12) to Mr. Mixon which directly discussed 
the "Substitution of Guarantor" aspect of the contract, one of 
the supposed "conditions," but never so much as mentioned the 
idea that the accounting suit must be dropped prior to contract 
formation. 
Given that (1) Mr. Crane was pursuing his lawful rights as a 
limited partner, (2) that Respondents never argued at trial that 
dismissal of the accounting lawsuit was a condition to formation 
of the contract, (3) that Respondents1 never clearly communicated 
any expectation that the accounting lawsuit be dropped prior to 
contract formation, and (4) that there is no Finding of Fact or 
Conclusion of Law issued by the trial court on the subject, 
Respondents should not be allowed to raise the matter, nor 
prevail thereon, initially on appeal. 
Appellants also urge this Court to conclude that the letter 
of February 18, 1985, contained no new conditions which would 
constitute a counteroffer, that such a letter was a valid and 
timely acceptance to Respondents1 ongoing offer, and that 
Respondents are bound to specifically perform all aspects of the 
subject contract. 
CONCLOSION 
In conclusion, Appellants assert that the task of this Court 
is to objectively review the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law as adopted by the trial court below to determine if there is 
evidence to support the same and whether any reversible error has 
been committed. This Court should refuse to consider the 
immaterial and irrelevant judgments of Respondents as to their 
assessment of Mr. Crane's credibility. In so doing, it should 
become apparent that there are only two issues in this case: (1) 
is the "mailbox rule" for contract formation viable in the State 
of Utah and applicable under the facts of this case?; and, (2) 
Did Appellants' acceptance of Respondents' offer contain any new 
conditions, which were not anticipated as a part of the contract, 
which would require the finding that Mr. Mixon's letter of 
February 18, 1985, constituted a counteroffer? 
Appellants urge the Court to find that the "mailbox rule" is 
applicable to the present circumstances; that, in accordance with 
the trial court's Findings of Fact, Appellants' letter of 
acceptance was dispatched before Respondents' attempted 
revocation; that such letter of acceptance was unconditional and 
did not amount to a counteroffer; and that tnere were no other 
conditions which would have precluded the formation of a valid 
and binding contract at the time the letter of acceptance was 
posted. 
If the Court reaches these conclusions, the Cranes also 
respectfully request that the Court vacate the decision of the 
trial court and remand with instructions to enter a proper 
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judgment which requires Dixie Title to disburse the $175,000, 
along with all appropriate interest, held in escrow to them and 
that they be awarded costs on appeal and reasonable attorney 
fees. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /tffL <3ay of July, 1988. 
JILLARD" R. ^ BISHOP 
Attorney for Appellants 
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